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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-4427 
____________ 
 
THOMAS J. GAGE, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARREN TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE & PLANNING 
BOARD MEMBERS; KEVIN PAGE; PROUT & 
CAMMAROTA, L.L.P.; DOROTHY D'ANGELO; MARK  
KRANE; JOHN CHADWICK; CHRISTIAN KASTRUD;  
ALAN A. SIEGEL; GARY DINARDO; VICTOR  
SORDILLO; DANIEL GALLIC; RICHARD P. KAUFMAN;  
SUZANNE SMITH; JERRY TOTH; DERRICK  
FREIJMIL; PETER VILLANI; STATE OF NEW JERSEY  
JUDICIARY OFFICES; MARIANNE CAMMAROTA;  
SLEEPY HOLLOW OF WARREN, LLC 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-11-cv-01501) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda Wolfson 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted on Motions for Summary Affirmance 
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 9, 2012 
 
Before:   RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
         
(Opinion filed: March 2, 2012) 
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____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Thomas Gage sought to challenge, in the New Jersey state courts, 
aspects of the Township of Warren Planning Board’s decision to grant preliminary 
subdivision approval to Sleepy Hollow of Warren, LLC.  Sleepy Hollow sought to 
develop a tract of land in Warren Township by building twenty single-family residences.  
Gage and his wife were neighboring property owners.  Taking events somewhat out of 
order, we note that, when Gage filed a second action in lieu of prerogative writs against 
Sleepy Hollow and the Warren Township Planning Board in the Law Division of the 
New Jersey Superior Court, the Honorable Fred H. Kumpf, on June 15, 2009, granted 
judgment to the defendants largely on the basis of res judicata.  Gage then appealed to the 
Appellate Division of the Superior Court. 
 In deciding the appeal, the Appellate Division first noted the circumstances of 
Gage’s original action in the Law Division, as follows: 
In September 2005, the Board granted preliminary site plan approval to 
Sleepy Hollow, on the condition that the developer would provide a 
secondary access road through the adjacent parkland owned by Somerset 
County.  In November 2005, [Gage] and his wife, then represented by 
counsel, filed an action in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division 
(“the first action”).  They alleged that the site plan approval was arbitrary, 
capricious, unreasonable, and an abuse of discretion, and sought to have the 
approval set aside.  The trial court in the first action rejected [Gage’s] 
contention that one of the Board members who had voted in favor of the 
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original preliminary site plan had a conflict of interest.  Thereafter, the 
court granted summary judgment to Sleepy Hollow and dismissed [Gage’s] 
claims against the Board.  All remaining claims were dismissed with 
prejudice, following a stipulation by the parties that was entered on October 
24, 2006. 
 
Gage v. Sleepy Hollow of Warren, LLC, 2010 WL 4121555, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. 
Div. 2010). 
 The Appellate Division then noted that, prior to the filing of Gage’s second state 
court action, Somerset County declined to allow the secondary access road contemplated 
by the first plan, and so Sleepy Hollow devised an alternative plan, which involved the 
installation of new traffic signals and the widening of Hillcrest Boulevard.  See id.  These 
changes were incorporated by Sleepy Hollow in its application to the Planning Board for 
amended preliminary major subdivision approval and partial final subdivision approval.  
See id.  In July, 2008, the Planning Board approved the amended application, and two 
months later the Planning Board issued a resolution granting Sleepy Hollow’s application 
for final major subdivision approval.  See id.  Gage’s second state court action followed 
in September, 2008.  In the second action, Gage, proceeding pro se, challenged the 
Planning Board’s actions with respect to the development, including the approval of the 
amended plans that eliminated the initially-contemplated secondary access road. 
 With that background in mind, the Appellate Division noted these contentions 
raised by Gage on appeal, in seeking review of Judge Kumpf’s decision:  (1) he (Gage) 
was entitled to a jury trial on his claims; (2) the defendants deprived him of due process 
and equal protection; (3) the judgment in the first action did not foreclose the present 
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claims; (4) the Planning Board meetings were incorrectly transcribed; (5) the approved 
subdivision did not comply with municipal land use laws; (6) the Planning Board’s and 
Sleepy Hollow’s engineer had a conflict of interest; (7) the secondary access road 
provided for as a condition in the original plan was required by law; (8) the Planning 
Board lacked a quorum when it approved the amended application in 2008; (9) Sleepy 
Hollow failed to give adequate notice of its amended plan to neighboring property 
owners; and (10) the estate of a Sleepy Hollow partner failed to disclose an ownership 
interest in the project.  See id. at *2. 
The Appellate Division, on October 10, 2010, rejected these arguments, 
substantially for the reasons given in Judge Kumpf’s written opinion.  See id.  The court 
explained: “We agree with the trial court that many of [Gage’s] claims in this second 
litigation are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because they either were, or could 
have been, brought in the first lawsuit, and by the entire controversy doctrine, which 
disfavors piecemeal successive litigation.”  Id. (citing Velasquez v. Franz, 589 A.2d 143 
(1991); Prevratil v. Mohr, 678 A.2d 243 (1996)).  The Appellate Division also held that, 
to the extent Gage’s claims were not barred by res judicata and entire controversy 
principles, they lacked merit in light of the deference owed to land use decisions made by 
local planning boards.  Gage did not seek discretionary review in the state supreme court. 
In March, 2011, Gage filed the instant civil action in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey against Sleepy Hollow of Warren, LLC, the Warren 
Township Planning Board, Judge Kumpf and the Appellate Division, the court reporter 
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who prepared the transcript of the Planning Board’s proceedings, the applicant for the 
development of the property adjacent to Gage’s and its owner, the applicant’s civil 
engineer, and several Warren Township officials.  The defendants moved in their 
respective groups to dismiss the amended complaint, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), each 
group raising numerous bases for dismissal, including the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see 
District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and the doctrine of res judicata.  In an order entered on 
November 30, 2011, the District Court agreed with the reasoning of the defendants, and 
dismissed the amended complaint. 
 Gage appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The appellees have 
moved in their respective groups for summary affirmance of the District Court’s orders 
dismissing the amended complaint.  Gage has submitted numerous summary action 
responses, which we have considered.  He has also submitted a motion for empanelment 
of a special grand jury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3331. 
We will summarily affirm.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we 
may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no substantial question 
is presented by the appeal.  We exercise plenary review over Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) 
dismissals.  See In re: Kaiser Group International Inc., 399 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(Rule 12(b)(1)); Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001) (Rule 
12(b)(6)). 
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 Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state court determinations.  See Turner v. 
Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).  Parties who 
wish to challenge a state court judgment may ultimately seek relief from the United 
States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, but the original jurisdiction vested in the 
Federal district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, does not extend to appellate jurisdiction over 
state court judgments.  Feldman, 460 U.S. 462; Rooker, 263 U.S. 413.  The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine is, however, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basics Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 
(2005).  The court is not precluded from exercising subject matter jurisdiction “simply 
because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state 
court.  If a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a 
legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party …, then 
there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under 
principles of preclusion.”  Id. at 293 (internal quotation marks and brackets removed). 
 Here, the state court judgments Gage attacked were entered before the federal suit 
was filed, and he was the loser in those actions.  He specifically sued the state court 
judges who rendered decisions that were not in his favor, and plainly was inviting the 
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District Court to review and reject those judgments.
1
 Several counts of the complaint 
asserted claims arising directly from the judgments of the state courts, accusing trial and 
appellate judges of constitutional and other violations, and seeking as relief that the 
judgments rendered against Gage be declared null and void.  These counts were properly 
dismissed pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(1). 
 To the extent that Gage did not claim damages arising from the state court 
judgments, his action is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, but consideration of 
the merits of his other claims is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata.  “When a prior 
case has been adjudicated in a state court, federal courts are required by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 
to give full faith and credit to the state judgment;” and, in doing so, a federal court 
applies “the same preclusion rules as would the courts of that state."  Edmundson v. 
Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  The 
District Court may take judicial notice of the record from a previous court proceeding 
between the parties.  See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 
414, 416 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). 
New Jersey law holds that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction will bar any identical future action between the parties and their privies.  See, 
e.g., Culver v. Ins. Co. of North America, 559 A.2d 400, 404-05 (N.J. 1989).  All matters 
                                              
1
 The defendant judges are, of course, absolutely immunized from a civil rights suit for 
money damages arising from their judicial acts.  Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) 
(per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). 
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which might have been raised by the parties in the former suit, as well as those that 
actually were raised, are barred in a subsequent proceeding.  See Kent Motor Cars, Inc. v. 
Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 25 A.3d 1027, 1036 (N.J. 2011).  As explained by the District 
Court, the defendants established that Gage’s federal suit against Sleepy Hollow, the 
Warren Township Planning Board, the court reporter who prepared the transcript of the 
Planning Board’s proceedings, the applicant for the development of the property, the 
applicant’s civil engineer, and the several Warren Township officials is identical to the 
suits he filed in state court that were decided on the merits (a complete list of which 
appears on pages 3 and 4 of Sleepy Hollow’s motion for summary affirmance).  The 
doctrine of claim preclusion is “central to the purpose for which civil courts have been 
established, the conclusive resolution of disputes,” and seeks to avoid the expense and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, while conserving judicial resources and fostering reliance 
on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.  Montana v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).  It was properly applied to Gage’s federal 
action to the extent that he did not claim damages arising from the state court judgments, 
and thus dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) was proper. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the appellees’ motions, and summarily 
affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint.  Gage’s motion 
for empanelment of a special grand jury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3331 is denied, because 
the statute invoked does not confer upon the courts discretion to afford an individual 
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litigant the criminal investigative resources of the United States in support of his private 
grievance. 
